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COMMENT
Rule 11(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure: Turner v. Duke
University, The New Standards of Judicial Review
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Rule 1 (a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
was amended.1 As amended, the rule is identical to Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure with the exception of one sentence.2 In
pertinent part, the new North Carolina version provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record .... A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or
other paper .... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a cer-
tificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reason-
able inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee.3
Former North Carolina Rule 11 (a) provided: "If a pleading is not signed
or if it is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. l1(a) (Supp. 1989). The amended rule became effec-
tive on January 1, 1987 and is applicable to pleadings, motions, or papers filed after January 1, 1987.
In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 681-82, 373 S.E.2d 317, 324 (1988); Kohn v. Mug-A-Bug, 94
N.C. App. 594, 597, 380 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1989).
2. The sentence that appears in Federal Rule 11, but not in North Carolina Rule 1 (a) reads:
"The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony
of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished." FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 (1936). This rule has not been available in North Carolina since 1868. W. Shuford,
NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 88 (3d ed. 1988). In 1987, Federal Rule 1 I
was amended to make it gender neutral. North Carolina Rule I I(a) is not gender neutral.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. Il(a) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
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stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as if the pleading
had not been-served." 4 Additionally, the Federal Rule permitted disci-
plinary action against the filer; but, the North Carolina Rule included no
such provision.' Yet even Federal Rule 11 was not effective in deterring
abuses.6 Consequently, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was amended in 1983.' Thereafter, in 1986, North Carolina adopted
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amended.8 It was not
until late July 1989 that the North Carolina Supreme Court, in Turner v.
Duke University,9 addressed standard of review issues at the trial and
appellate levels.
A. Standard of Review at the Trial Court Level
In Turner, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial
court's standard of review of a Rule 11 (a) motion is one of "objective
reasonableness." 1 This conclusion is not surprising because the objec-
tive reasonableness standard has been applied in all federal jurisdictions
that have addressed the issue1' and is endorsed by the advisory commit-
tee's note to Federal Rule 11.12
Prior to the amendment of Federal Rule 11, a showing of bad faith was
necessary in order to impose sanctions. The federal courts have held that
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, R. Civ. P. li(a) (1967).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1936); N.C. GEN. STAT. § iA-i, R. Civ. P. 1 l(a) (1967). Estrada v.
Burnham, 316 N.C. 318, 325 n.5, 341 S.E.2d 538, 543 n.5 (1986).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note (1983); See 6 Wright & Miller, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1334 (1971); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 869-
70 (5th Cir. 1988).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983); See 6 Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1334 (1971); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
8. N.C., Gen. Stat. § lA-i, R. Civ. P. l1(a) (Supp. 1989). Rule II (b), (c), and (d) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure have no counterparts in the Federal Rule. W. Shuford,
NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 88 (3d ed. 1988).
9. 91 N.C. App. 446, 372 S.E.2d 320 (1988), rev'd, 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989).
10. Turner, 325 N.C. at 164, 381 S.E.2d at 713 (1989). This standard of review is applied in all
federal jurisdictions and all state jurisdictions that have adopted Federal Rule I I as amended in
1983. For a full explanation of this standard, see infra text and accompanying notes 56-87.
11. See, e.g., Eastway Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Eavenson,
Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866
(1988); Century Prod., Inc., v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Federation of State
Medical Bds. of U.S., 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1987); O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d
823 (9th Cir. 1986); Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 804 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1986); Donaldson v. Clark,
819 F.2d 1551 (1 th Cir. 1987); Westmoreland v. C.B.S., Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The
First Circuit has not yet addressed the issue.
12. The relevant portion of the advisory committee's note states:
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to
satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the
circumstances. This standard is more stringent than the original good faith formula and thus it
is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation.
FED. R. CIV. P. I I advisory committee's note (1983) (emphasis added).
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under the new rule, bad faith is no longer required.' 3 Adopting this in-
terpretation, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Turner held that a
showing of bad faith is not necessary to impose sanctions under the
North Carolina Rule. 4 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that
every federal court that has considered the question is in accord. 5 Given
the uniform nature of the case law on this issue, this comment will
merely set out the areas of concern, give general guidelines, and direct
the reader to supporting authority.
B. Standard of Review at the Appellate Level
Federal and state courts differ concerning the standard of review on
appeal.' 6 Turner however, did not adopt any existing standard, but cre-
ated a new variation. The North Carolina standard of appellate review
for a denial or granting of a Rule I l(a) motion as adopted in Turner is as
follows:
The trial court's decision to impose or not impose mandatory sanctions
under N.C.G.S. sec. lA-l, Rule 11 (a) is reviewable de novo as a legal
issue. In the de novo review, the appellate court will determine. (1)
whether the trial court's conclusions of law support its judgment or de-
termination, (2) whether the trial court's conclusions of law are sup-
ported by its findings of fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact are
supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. If the appellate court makes
these three determinations in the affirmative, it must uphold the trial
court's decision to impose or deny the imposition of mandatory sanctions
under N.C.G.S. sec. IA-l, Rule 11(a). 17
The plain meaning of this standard is inconsistent with a de novo review
and is inconsistent with the Turner court's broader analysis. Whether
the plain language of the standard or the Turner court's apparent intent
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983); Eastway Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of U.S., 830 F.2d
1429 (7th Cir. 1987); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986); Stevens v.
Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Green-
wald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. C.B.S., Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
14. Turner, 325 N.C. at 164, 381 S.E.2d at 713.
15. Id.
16. For the various standards applied at the federal appellate level, see infra text and accompa-
nying notes 88-91. Twenty-one state courts have adopted the 1983 Amended Federal Rule 11. Sev-
eral others have adopted similar rules. Many of these courts have not yet addressed what standard
of review will be applied at the appellate level. Of the courts that have addressed the issue: (a)
Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, and Washington apply an abuse of discretion standard as
to all questions presented on Rule 11; (b) Arizona, Iowa, Kentucky, and North Dakota apply a
three-tiered test, whereby the findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, the
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and the type of sanctions imposed are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard; and (c) Michigan has chosen to apply a clearly erroneous standard to
all issues presented under Rule 11. This comment only analyzes the federal decisions concerning
Rule 11.
17. 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
3
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should control is still at issue. Unfortunately, there have been no North
Carolina cases, post Turner, that have interpreted the new appellate stan-
dard.'" This comment analyzes the facts giving rise to Turner and the
standards of review set out in Turner. The purpose of this comment is to
provide the reader with the tools necessary to interpret the North Caro-
lina standards of review.
II. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As the focus of this comment is Rule 1 (a) 9 and conduct giving rise to
sanctions, the text is limited to a discussion of the events leading to the
imposition of sanctions and will not address the facts giving rise to the
plaintiff's cause of action.2" In Turner, the plaintiff brought a wrongful
18. See Shook v. Shook, 95 N.C. App. 578, 383 S.E.2d 405 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C.
50, - S.E.2d - (1990). In Shook, the North Carolina Court of Appeals purported to apply the
standard of appellate review adopted in Turner. However, it appears from the opinion that the
Turner standard was not applied. See infra text and accompanying notes 123-127.
19. While this comment does not discuss Rule 26(g) in any detail, the reader is alerted that
certification of discovery papers is governed by Rule 26(g) not Rule 11(a). FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee note (1983). However, discovery motions are governed by Rule 11 (a). Id. See
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986).
20. In 1982, Ms. Turner was diagnosed as having lung cancer and underwent chemotherapy
and radiation treatments. Turner, 325 N.C. at 154-55, 381 S.E.2d at 708. She later developed herpes
zoster (shingles), which disappeared but left her with constant post-herpetic pain in her upper right
back. Id. at 155, 381 S.E.2d 708. It was for this condition that she was referred to Dr. Friedman.
Id. On the afternoon of August 25, 1983, Ms. Turner was admitted to Duke for possible treatment
of her postherpetic pain. New Brief for Appellant at 2, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381
S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No. 526A88). Upon admission, she was examined by Dr. Woodworth, a neurol-
ogy resident who was an employee of Duke. Turner, 325 N.C. at 155, 381 S.E.2d at 708. Dr.
Woodworth noted that Ms. Turner had been experiencing constipation and had been taking medica-
tion without success in an attempt to alleviate the problem. Id.
Later that afternoon, Dr. Friedman discussed with the Turners tests that would be performed. Id.
That night, Ms. Turner took medication for her constipation with no relief. Id. The following
morning, Dr. Friedman stopped at Ms. Turner's room to review her chart but did not enter the room
as it appeared she was asleep. Id. When Ms. Turner awoke and throughout the morning, she com-
plained of constipation and abdominal cramping. Id. At about 11:00 a.m., Dr. Woodworth ordered
that Ms. Turner be given a saline enema; then, if no relief, one-half a bottle of magnesium citrate;
and if no relief by 2:00 p.m., the other half bottle. Id. at 155-56, 381 S.E.2d at 708. None of these
efforts were successful and Ms. Turner continued to complain of abdominal cramping. Id. at 156,
381 S.E.2d at 708-09. Dr. Friedman failed to see Ms. Turner that afternoon as she had been trans-
ferred to another part of the hospital at about 2:00 p.m. Id. at 156, 381 S.E.2d at 709. At about 3:00
p.m., Dr. Havard, who had been called upon by Dr. Friedman to evaluate Ms. Turner's cancer,
examined Ms. Turner. Id. His evaluation was repeatedly interrupted by Ms. Turner's trips to the
bathroom. Id. He noted on her chart that she was complaining of extreme abdominal cramping,
nausea, and vomiting. Id.
At 5:00 p.m., Mr. Turner, becoming increasingly concerned about his wife's abdominal pain,
made repeated attempts to have his wife examined by a physician. Id. Despite his pleas, Ms. Turner
was not evaluated until Dr. Woodworth examined her sometime between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. Id.
Upon discovering that Ms. Turner's bowel was distended, Dr. Woodworth immediately ordered
blood work and x-rays and contacted the surgeon on duty. Id. When Dr. Woodworth returned to
Ms. Turner, he found her unresponsive and in shock. Id. X-rays revealed that Ms. Turner's colon
was perforated. Id. At 12:00 a.m., exploratory surgery was performed during which it was discov-
ered that Ms. Turner's abdomen was full of stool. Id. It was determined that there was a large
4
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death action against Duke University (Duke), Private Diagnostic Clinic
(PDC), and Allan H. Friedman, M.D. (Dr. Friedman), alleging that de-
fendants were negligent in failing to diagnose and treat his wife and that
such negligence was a proximate cause of his wife's subsequent death.2"
On April 25, 1986, plaintiff served defendant Duke with his Second Set
of Interrogatories in which Interrogatory Number 13 requested Duke to
identify any persons who had any knowledge about the care and treat-
ment of Ms. Turner while she was at Duke; to state the substance of that
knowledge; and to identify the individual by name, address, telephone
number, and job title.22 On May 27, 1986, Duke responded to Interro-
gatory Number 13 by referring plaintiff to Ms. Turner's medical
records.23 On July 28, 1986 plaintiff filed a motion to compel, which in
part requested the court to compel Duke to answer Interrogatory
Number 13 directly, rather than by reference to the medical records.24
The trial court, on August 6, 1986 entered an Order which provided in
part:
As to Interrogatory No. 13, it appearing that the names and addresses of
the witnesses were not listed as requested, and although the objection is
sustained,25 defense counsel is requested to provide this information as to
specific individuals if requested at a later date by plaintiff's counsel.26
By letter of May 13, 1987, plaintiff requested that Duke, pursuant to the
August 6 Order, provide "a list of the names and addresses of the wit-
nesses requested under Interrogatory No. 13. ' ' 27 Plaintiff received no re-
sponse.28 On June 4, 1987, the trial court ordered all parties to
impaction of fecal matter in her colon and that nothing could be done to save her life. Id. at 156-57,
381 S.E.2d at 709. At 4:10 a.m., Ms. Turner was pronounced dead. Id. at 157, 381 S.E.2d at 709.
Autopsy revealed the cause of death to be perforation of the colon which led to bacterial peritonitis
and sepsis. Id. (Bacterial peritonitis is defined as inflammation of the abdomen caused by bacteria,
stemming from, for example, a perforated digestive tract. See I. Dox, MELLONI'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 367 (2d ed. 1985). Sepsis is defined as pus forming microorganisms, or their
toxins, in the blood. Id., at 432).
21. Turner, 325 N.C. at 154-55, 381 S.E.2d at 709.
22. Id. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. There is no objection set out in defendant's answer to interrogatory No. 13. New Brief of
Appellant at 28 n.2, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No.526A88).
26. Turner, 325 N.C. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
27. New Brief for Appellee at 8, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989)
(No.526A88) (quoting letter from plaintiff's counsel to Duke's counsel); Turner, 325 N.C. at 166,
381 S.E.2d at 714.
28. Turner, 325 N.C. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714. Defendant Duke argued in its Brief that the
August 6, 1986 Order was not violated by Duke, but rather by plaintiff in that plaintiff never re-
quested the information as to specific individuals. New Brief for Appellee at 25-26, Turner v. Duke
Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No. 526A88). The North Carolina Court of Appeals
recognized that this Order was ambiguous and interpreted it to mean that Duke was required to
provide the requested information if the plaintiff asked about specific individuals. Turner v. Duke
Univ., 91 N.C. App. 446, 450, 372 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1988). The North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals holding and stated: "[Duke's] argument is disingenuous. A more
5
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supplement all outstanding interrogatories on or before July 1, 1987.29
On June 25, 1987, defendant Friedman provided his supplemental re-
sponse to interrogatories, in which he identified Dr. Havard, Visalia, Cal-
ifornia, address unknown, as an expected witness.3" On July 1, 1987,
Duke provided by letter a list of witnesses who were expected to be called
at trial; included in the list was a Dr. Havard.3 1 For each of the wit-
nesses listed, no address or any information concerning the substance of
his or her testimony was provided. 2 On July 6, 1987, Duke hand deliv-
ered a Notice to Take the Deposition of Dr. Havard in California on July
21, 1987, six days prior to trial, and a Notice to Take the Deposition of
Dr. Scheerer in Florida on July 23, 1987, four days prior to trial.3 3 Dr.
Havard was an Oncology34 Fellow who saw Ms. Turner during her stay
at Duke.35 Dr. Scheerer was an Oncologist 36 who had treated Ms. Tur-
ner's cancer in Florida.37
On July 17, 1987, plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions against Duke
logical interpretation of the order's somewhat ambiguous language is that Duke was directed to
provide information as to specific individuals who Duke intended to present as witnesses if requested
to do so at a later date by plaintiff's counsel." Turner, 325 N.C. at 169, 381 S.E.2d at 716 (empha-
sis added). The supreme court noted that it would "defy logic" to expect the plaintiff to decipher an
illegible signature in order to request the information contemplated by Interrogatory No. 13. Id.
The supreme court then concluded that plaintiff had requested Duke to comply with the August 6,
1986 Order and that Duke failed to do so. Id.
29. Id. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714. The July 1, 1987 deadline was set at a hearing on a motion in
this case to which Duke was not a party (plaintiff's Motion to Compel against defendant Friedman).
New Brief for Appellee at 8, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No.
526A88). No one from the firm representing Duke was present at the hearing when the deadline was
set. Id. In its Brief, Duke referred to the Affidavit of William Daniell (attorney for Dr. Friedman/
PDC), which was purported to state that the June 4 Order was entered with the understanding that
Duke would be notified before a proposed order was submitted to the court. Id. Duke received no
such notification. Id. Neither the North Carolina Court of Appeals nor the North Carolina Supreme
Court addressed Duke's arguments. Turner, 91 N.C. App. 446, 372 S.E.2d 320 (1988), rev'd, 325
N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989). Nevertheless, Duke received a copy of the signed order on June 8,
1987 (New Brief for Appellee at 8, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989)
(No.526A88)). It can be reasonably inferred that the court did not find Duke's absence from the
hearing to be prejudicial.
30. Turner, 325 N.C. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
31. Id. More specifically, Duke responded that it expected to call any witnesses called by the
plaintiff and defendant Friedman and any health care providers whose names were listed in Ms.
Turner's Duke medical chart. New Brief for Appellee at 10, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152,
381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No. 526A88). Duke then gave its list of witnesses prefaced by the phrase
"individuals include, but are not limited to." Id.
32. Turner, 325 N.C. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714-15.
33. Id. at 166-67, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
34. This is defined as a cancer specialist.
35. Turner, 325 N.C. at 167, 381 S.E.2d at 715. Dr. Havard was not identified as a possible
witness for Duke until July 1, 1987. New Brief for Appellant at 26, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C.
152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No. 526A88). The only identification of Dr. Havard in the medical
records is on the bottom of one page and it is illegible. Turner, 325 N.C. at 169, 381 S.E.2d at 716.
36. See supra note 34.
37. Turner, 325 N.C. at 167, 381 S.E.2d at 716.
6
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under Rules 1 l(a), 26(g)3" and 37(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure alleging: (1) that Duke failed to comply with an order
instructing it to answer Interrogatory Number 13 when so requested by
plaintiff; (2) that Duke failed to comply with an order instructing it to
identify all expert witnesses it expected to call by June 17, 1987; (3) that
Duke failed to comply with an order instructing all parties to supplement
outstanding interrogatories by July 1, 1987; and (4) that Duke noticed
depositions of two expert witnesses post June 17, 1987 for an improper
purpose and to harass plaintiff's counsel in contravention of Rule
11 (a).39 Plaintiff sought an order that: (1) struck the notices of deposi-
tion of Dr. Havard and Dr. Scheerer as sham and disallowed the deposi-
tion testimony into evidence; (2) struck the defensive pleadings of Duke
and entered Default Judgment against it; (3) taxed Duke with attorney's
fees and expenses in preparing and arguing the motion for sanctions; and
(4) granted any other relief the court deemed just and proper.40 A hear-
ing on the motion was held on July 20, 1987 following which plaintiff's
motion was denied. a
On July 27, 1987, Turner was tried in the Superior Court of Durham
County, North Carolina.42 At the end of plaintiff's evidence, a directed
verdict was entered in favor of defendants Friedman and Private Diag-
nostic Clinic.43 Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Duke.44
Plaintiff appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals assigning as
error: (1) the trial court's order granting a directed verdict as to defend-
ants Friedman and Private Diagnostic Clinic and (2) the denial of plain-
38. Plaintiff did not cite Rule 26 (g) as a basis for his July 17, 1987 motion for sanctions. New
Brief for Appellee at 12 n.12, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No.
526A88). However, Duke concedes in its brief that Rule 26(g) is the mirror image of Rule l(a) and
that the standards of review should be the same. Id.
There is a typographical error in the Turner North Carolina Supreme Court opinion. Turner, 325
N.C. at 167, 381 S.E.2d 715. Rule 26(a) should read Rule 26(g). See, Turner, 325 N.C. at 157, 381
S.E.2d at 709. See also supra note 19.
39. Turner, 325 N.C. at 157, 167, 381 S.E.2d at 709, 715; N.C. Gen. Stat. § IA-i, R. Civ. P. 11
(Supp. 1989).
On April 27, 1987, an order was entered directing plaintiff to identify his expert witnesses on or
before May 18, 1987 and defendants to identify their expert witnesses on or before June 17, 1987.
New Brief of Appellee at 7, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No.
526A88); New Brief of Appellant at 3, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989)
(No. 526A88). The order is not discussed in Turner, other than when setting out plaintiff's allega-
tions in his motion to compel. See Turner, 325 N.C. at 157, 381 S.E.2d at 709. This may be because
it was determined that neither Dr. Havard nor Dr. Scheerer were "expert" witnesses and therefore,
the April 27 Order was not germane to the court's analysis. Id. at 168, 381 S.E.2d at 715-16.
40. Turner, 325 N.C. at 167, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
41. Id. at 167, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
42. Turner, 91 N.C. App. 446, 447, 372 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1988).
43. Turner, 325 N.C. at 157, 381 S.E.2d at 709.
44. Id.
7
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tiff's motion for sanctions against Duke.45 On October 4, 1988, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the directed verdict as to de-
fendants Friedman and Private Diagnostic Clinic, with one judge dissent-
ing, and upheld the denial of plaintiff's motion for sanctions. 46  In
reviewing the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for sanctions, the
court of appeals noted that the North Carolina courts had not yet ad-
dressed the issue of which standard of review should be applied in re-
viewing Rule 11 (a) decisions of the trial court.47 Looking to the federal
courts for guidance, and citing Westmoreland v. C.B.S., Inc.,48 the court
of appeals held that a "clearly erroneous' 49 standard should apply.50
Applying this standard, the court failed to find that the trial court's order
was "clearly erroneous.'" Plaintiff appealed as a matter of right5" the
affirmance of the order granting a directed verdict to defendants Fried-
man and Private Diagnostic Clinic53 and filed a Petition for Discretion-
ary Review as to the denial of his motion for sanctions against Duke.54
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted plaintiff's Petition for Dis-
cretionary Review on December 8, 1988.11
45. Id.
46. Id. at 154, 381 S.E.2d at 708.
47. Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 449, 372 S.E.2d at 322 (1988).
48. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Under Rule 11, sanctions may be imposed if a reasonable inquiry discloses the pleading, motion,
or paper is (1) not well-grounded in fact, (2) not warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or (3) interposed for any
improper purpose such as harassment or delay.... [Tihe district court is accorded wide discre-
tion. For the court has tasted the flavor of the litigation and is in the best position to make these
kinds of determinations.
Id. at 1174-75 (emphasis added).
49. Black's Law Dictionary defines "clearly erroneous" as: "Findings when based upon sub-
stantial error in proceedings or misapplication of law, Kauk v. Anderson, 137 F.2d 331, 333 (8th
Cir. 1943); or when unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to clear weight of evidence or
induced by erroneous view of law. Gasifier Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 138 F.2d 197, 199
(8th Cir. 1943); Smith v. Porter, 143 F.2d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1943)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
228 (5th ed. 1979).
50. "A reviewing court must consider whether the trial court based its decision on the relevant
factors before it and whether the judgment was clearly erroneous." Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 449,
372 S.E.2d at 323 (1988).
51. Id. at 446, 453, 372 S.E.2d at 325 (1988).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1967) provides in part: "[A]n appeal lies of right to the
Supreme Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case... (2) In which there
is a dissent."
53. Turner, 325 N.C. at 157, 381 S.E.2d at 710. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals and held "that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to take his case to the jury."
Id. at 162, 381 S.E.2d at 712. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the superior court for further
proceedings. Id. at 171, 381 S.E.2d at 717-18. This comment will not analyze the portion of the
decision that discusses review of the order granting the directed verdict.
54. Turner, 325 N.C. 157,.381 S.E.2d at 710.
55. New Brief of Appellant at 6, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989)
(No. 526A88).
8
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL
As stated earlier, given the uniformity of the federal decisions on this
issue, this comment will merely set out the areas of concern, provide
general guidelines, and direct the reader to supporting authority.
A. Holding and Analysis of Turner v. Duke University
The Turner court held: "[A] showing of substantive bad faith is un-
necessary under N.C.G.S. sec. lA-l, Rule 11 (a). Rather the standard
under our Rule 1 l(a) is one of objective reasonableness under the circum-
stances."56 In reaching its conclusion, thecourt relied on the advisory
committee's note and several federal court decisions.57 The relevant por-
tion of the advisory committee's note states:
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both
the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule.
The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. This stan-
dard is more stringent than the original good faith formula and thus it is
expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation.
58
Turner provided no further analysis of this issue. To merely state that
the standard of review is one of "objective reasonableness" is an over
simplification that provides little guidance to the trial court, the appellate
court, or the practicing attorney.
B. The Federal Courts
In order to fully understand the Turner court's standard of review at
the trial court level, it is necessary to look to the federal courts for
guidance.
1. The "Frivolous" Clause
Under Rule 11, there are two grounds for imposing sanctions. 59 The
first is found in the "frivolous" clause.' The frivolous clause of Rule 11
is composed of two subparts: (a) whether reasonable inquiry was made
into the facts; and (b) whether reasonable inquiry was made into the
law.61 If either subpart is not satisfied, Rule 11 is violated.62 The test is
whether a reasonable attorney in like circumstances could not believe
that the signer's actions are factually and legally justified.63 The addition
56. Turner, 325 N.C. at 164, 381 S.E.2d at 713 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983) (emphasis added).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, R. Civ. P. Il(a) (Supp. 1989); Brown
v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of U.S., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987).
60. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987). See also Lyles v. K-Mart Corp., 703 F.
9
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of the phrase "formed after reasonable inquiry," in the new rule, imposes
on each attorney an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into
the viability of a pleading before it is signed.'M It is not enough that an
attorney acted in good faith or was unaware of the groundless nature of
an argument or claim."
Several factors which the trial court should consider in determining
whether an attorney has made a reasonable inquiry into the facts of a
case include:
(1) the complexity of the facts;66
(2) the extent to which a pre-filing investigation would be beneficial;67
(3) the amount of time available for investigation;68
(4) the extent to which it is necessary to rely on information provided
by the client;6
9
(5) the extent to which the attorney relied on the client for factual
information;7"
(6) whether the case was accepted from another attorney; 7 and
(7) the extent to which the development of the facts requires
discovery.72
Factors that should be considered in determining whether a reasonable
inquiry into the law was made include:
(1) the underlying policy that Rule 11 should not chill an attorney's
enthusiasm or creativity;
73
Supp. 435, 440 (W.D.N.C. 1989)("Whether a reasonable attorney in like circumstances would be-
lieve his actions to be factually and legally justified." (emphasis added)).
64. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985).
65. 1d.
66. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875-76 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1385-86 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
67. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Thomas, 836 F.2d at 875-76; Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
791 F.2d 1006, 1012 (2d Cir. 1986) (all documents were in the control of the opposing party).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983); Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Century
Prod., Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 250 (6th Cir. 1988); Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983); Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Century,
837 F.2d at 250-51; Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86. For more guidance as to when a reasonable
inquiry requires more than mere -reliance on the representations of the client, see Harris, 679 F.
Supp. at 1385-86; Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 519 (N.D. Il. 1985); Nassau-
Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 684, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Whit-
tington v. Ohio River Co., 1 15F.R.D. 201, 206 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v.
Group Sys. Int'l Far East, Ltd., 109 F.R.D. 594, 597 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
70. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 875-76 and see infra note 71.
71. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809
F.2d 548, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822(1989); Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Cen-
tury, 837 F.2d at 250-51; Thomas, 836 F.2d at 875-76; Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
72. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 875-76; Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983). In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 448
(5th Cir. 1985) ("A court must take care not to penalize arguments for legal evolution."); Gaiardo v.
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987). In In re TCI, the attorney argued for expansion of
law to allow an exception to the employment at will doctrine for "whistle-blowers." The court held
10
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(2) the time available to the attorney to prepare the document;74
(3) the time available to the attorney to research the law;75
(4) the plausibility of the legal view;76
(5) the identity of the signer (an attorney or a litigant pro se); 77
(6) the complexity of the factual and legal issues;78
(7) whether the attorney depended on referring counsel or another
member of the bar;79 and,
(8) whether the document was a good faith effort to extend or modify
the law.8°
2. The "Improper Purpose" Clause
The second ground for the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 is
found in the "improper purpose" clause.8 The improper purpose clause
prohibits the filing of any document for the purpose of harassment, delay,
or needless increase in the cost of litigation.8 2 As with the frivolous
clause, the test is one of objective reasonableness.8 3 The signer is not
excused because he did not intend to bring about harassment, delay
or expense.84 If reasonable steps could have been taken to avoid the har-
assment, delay, or needless increase in litigation costs, sanctions are ap-
propriate. 85  The acts are therefore objectively tested86  without
consideration of the signer's subjective intent.87
that it will not inhibit imaginative legal or factual approaches to the law, especially where the attor-
ney has informed the court that he is seeking a modification or change in the law.
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983); Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Thomas,
836 F.2d at 875-76; Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
75. Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note (1983); Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Thomas,
836 F.2d at 875-76; Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
77. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Thomas, 836 F.2d at 875-76.
78. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Thomas, 836 F.2d at 875-76; Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
80. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Harris, 679 F. Supp. at 1385-86. There is a large body of case law
on this issue. See, e.g., Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (a pleader need
not be correct in his view of the law, but he must have a good faith belief in the merits of his
argument); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d at 445 (5th Cir. 1985) ("if a lawyer pursues a path that a
reasonably careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound, the con-
duct is objectively unreasonable.").
81. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1436. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ.
P. 11(a) (Supp 1989).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. 11(a) (Supp. 1989).
83. Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986);
Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831 n. 9.
84. Lieb v. Topstone Indust., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3rd Cir. 1986).
85. Id.
86. For example: Does Act X + Act Y + Act Z - harassment, delay, or increase in litigation
costs?
87. For example: Did the plaintiff intend to harass the defendant when he filed his lawsuit? See
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d at 832 (9th Cir. 1986).
11
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3. Overview
Turner provides limited guidance into the standard of review at the
trial court level. Fortunately, the case law in the federal courts on this
issue is well developed. The rules and factors which have been applied
by the federal courts will, no doubt, influence the North Carolina courts.
Thus, every trial lawyer should be aware of these guidelines and practice
accordingly.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL
A. Holding and Analysis of Turner v. Duke University
1. The Court's Review of Existing Standards
In Turner, the court acknowledged that federal courts have taken
three different approaches in determining the applicable standard of ap-
pellate review."8 The standards set out in the first approach are as fol-
lows: (1) a legal conclusion that the conduct violated Rule 11 is a legal
issue reviewable de novo; (2) disputed factual determinations are re-
viewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard; and (3) the appropriateness
of an imposed sanction is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" stan-
dard. 9 The second approach discussed in Turner reviews de novo the
legal sufficiency of a pleading or motion and the determination to impose
sanctions. The second approach also reviews the factual reasons and the
amount and type of sanctions imposed under an "abuse of discretion"
standard.9" The third approach taken by the federal courts applies an
"abuse of discretion" standard across the board.9
88. Id. at 164-65, 381 S.E.2d at 713-14. Not mentioned in the opinion is the standard applied
by the Seventh Circuit in Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569 (7th Cir. 1987), and In re Ronco, Inc.,
838 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988). In those cases, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard to the
legal conclusions drawn, a "clearly erroneous" standard to the factual conclusions rendered, and an
abuse of discretion standard to the "appropriateness" of the sanctions imposed. It should be noted
that the seventh circuit is split on the issue of which appellate standard is applied. Brown v. Federa-
tion of State Medical Bds. of U.S., 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1987); Harp Ins. Corp. v. McQuade, 825
F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1987); Ordower, 826 F.2d 1569 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Ronco, 838 F.2d 212 (7th
Cir. 1988).
89. Turner, 325 N.C. at 164-65, 381 S.E.2d at 713 (citing Brown, 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir.
1987)); Zaldivar, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
90. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 713-14 (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551
(11 th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Westmoreland v. C.B.S., Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985)).
91. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714 (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc.,
836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988); O'Connell v. Champion Intern. Corp., 812 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1987);
EBI, Inc. v. Gator Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986); Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th
Cir. 1986); Stevens v. Lawyer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986)).
12
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2. The Standard Adopted in Turner
The supreme court, "after careful analysis of the rule and the federal
decisions, "92 created its own appellate standard of review:
The trial court's decision to impose or not impose mandatory sanctions
under N.C.G.S. sec. lA-i, Rule 11 (a) is reviewable de novo as a legal
issue. In the de novo review, the appellate court will determine (1)
whether the trial court's conclusions of law support its judgment or de-
termination, (2) whether the trial court's conclusions of law are sup-
ported by its findings of fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact are
supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. If the appellate court makes
these three determinations in the affirmative, it must uphold the trial
court's decision to impose or deny the imposition of mandatory sanctions
under N.C.G.S. sec. IA-1, Rule 11(a).93
3. The Turner Court's Analysis
Attempting to apply the newly adopted standard to the facts in Tur-
ner, the supreme court held that the denial of plaintiff's motion for sanc-
tions under Rule 1 (a) was not warranted.94 In reaching its conclusion,
the court focused on whether the trial court's conclusion of law that
Duke's conduct did not trigger Rule 11 (a) was supported by the facts. 5
The plaintiff alleged:
(1) that Dr. Scheerer was an expert witness and that Duke failed to
disclose his identity in a timely manner,
(2) that Duke failed to identify Dr. Havard in response to other dis-
covery requests;
(3) that the doctor's depositions threatened to cause a needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation and an unnecessary delay; and
(4) that the depositions were noticed for an improper purpose, that
is, to disrupt his counsel's trial preparation.96 The court found that alle-
gation numbers 2, 3 and 4 had merit, and in combination, were sufficient
to trigger Rule 1 (a) sanctions.97
Plaintiff's second allegation was based on Duke's failure to identify
Dr. Havard in response to plaintiff's Interrogatory Number 13 when re-
quested to do so by plaintiff.9" The Court Order entered August 6, 1986
compelled Duke to provide the information requested in Interrogatory
92. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714-15.
95. Id. at 166-67, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
96. Id. at 167, 381 S.E. at 715.
97. Id. The first allegation was rejected because it was determined that Dr. Scheerer was not an
expert witness. Id. at 167-68, 381 S.E.2d at 715-16. "[N]ot every role of a doctor as a witness... is
in the capacity of an 'expert' witness." Id. at 168, 381 S.E.2d at 715. As this is an ancillary issue, it
will not be discussed in this comment.
98. Turner, 325 N.C. at 168-69, 381 S.E.2d at 716.
13
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Number 13 "as to specific individuals if requested at a later date by plain-
tiff's counsel." 99 As discussed earlier,"°° Duke contended the Order of
August 6 was ambiguous and that it was under no duty to respond until
plaintiff provided the names of specific individuals about which informa-
tion was requested by Interrogatory Number 13.101 The supreme court
rejected this argument and held that Duke had failed to comply with the
August 6 Order when it failed to respond to a written request from plain-
tiff requesting an answer to Interrogatory Number 13.02
Plaintiff's third allegation was that the noticing of the depositions of
Dr. Havard and Dr. Scheerer "threatened to cause a needless increase in
the costs of litigation and an unnecessary delay."10 3 The court noted that
Duke had argued at the Rule 1 (a) hearing that Dr. Scheerer's deposi-
tion testimony was needed because plaintiff planned to introduce testi-
mony at trial on the issue of whether Ms. Turner's cancer" was
resectable.'05 Duke further asserted at that hearing that Duke's expert
witness, Dr. Ozer, would only be giving testimony regarding Ms. Tur-
ner's life expectancy.10 6 The court then refers to both the deposition and
trial testimony'0 7 of Dr. Ozer, wherein he testifies concerning the resect-
ability of Ms. Turner's cancer.' 0 8 Based on these findings, the court held
that Dr. Scheerer's deposition testimony was duplicative. 1°9
Continuing with its analysis of plaintiff's third allegation, the court
considered two arguments asserted by Duke.1 0 First, Duke argued that
plaintiff could have reduced costs by accepting its suggestion to take the
depositions by phone.11 ' The court rejected this argument and found
that it had no bearing on the threshold issue of whether Rule 11 (a) had
been violated.' Secondly, the court considered Duke's argument that
plaintiff objected to any continuance of the trial."t 3 The court deemed
99. Id.
100. See supra note 28.
101. Turner, 325 N.C. at 169, 381 S.E.2d at 716.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 167, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
104. For facts of the case, see supra note 20.
105. Turner, 325 N.C. at 169, 381 S.E.2d at 716. Resectable means removable by surgery.
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983).
106. Turner, 325 N.C. at 170, 381 S.E.2d at 716.
107. It is important to note that the trial testimony was not evidence before the judge at the Rule
1 (a) hearing.
108. Turner, 325 N.C. at 170, 381 S.E.2d at 716-17.
109. Id. at 170, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The court, in dicta, did note this argument may have been more properly directed to
the mandatory sanctions clause of Rule 1 l(a). Id. All cases of which this writer is aware have
indicated that once a violation of Rule 11 occurs, some type of sanction is mandatory. However, the
court's intent may have been to simply point out that Duke's argument was relevant to the determi-
nation as to the type of sanction imposed.
113. Id. While it is not apparent from the opinion, this argument was advanced by Duke to
14
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Duke's argument to be supportive of plaintiff's claim that the noticing
was filed to cause unnecessary delay." 4 Based on these findings, the
court held that plaintiff's third allegation had merit." 5
Plaintiff's fourth allegation was that the depositions of Dr. Scheerer
and Dr. Havard were noticed for an "improper purpose" such as to dis-
rupt plaintiff's counsel's trial preparation. 1 6 The supreme court agreed
with plaintiff's counsel that two depositions, one in Florida four days
before trial, and one in California six days before trial, would have ren-
dered him unable to conscientiously prepare his client's case for trial. 7
Based on this finding, the court stated, "[t]he inference that the noticing
and taking of the depositions of Dr. Havard and Dr. Scheerer represents
an attempt to harass plaintiff's counsel in violation of Rule 1 (a) is not
difficult to make." ' The court then concluded: (1) that it was con-
vinced that several violations of Rule 11 (a) had occurred; (2) that Rule
11 (a) sanctions are mandatory; and (3) that the court of appeals erred in
affirming the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion under Rule 11(a)
for sanctions." 9 The court then ordered that the case be remanded for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 2°
On remand, the Durham County Superior Court entered an Order on
October 24, 1989, which: (1) made findings of fact and conclusions of
law consistent with the supreme court opinion; (2) made an additional
conclusion of law that Duke's counsel's personal, physical, and emo-
tional strain in June 1987 did not mitigate the sanctions necessary in this
case; 12' (3) awarded attorney fees in the amount of $6,445; (4) struck the
notices of deposition of Dr. Havard and Dr. Scheerer and held that the
depositions could not be introduced at any subsequent trial; (5) granted
plaintiff a new trial against Duke; (6) awarded costs in the amount of
$1,962; and (7) stated that a public reprimand was not necessary.' 22
show that plaintiff suffered no undue prejudice from the noticing of the depositions and thus, the
granting of a new trial against Duke would be inappropriate. New Brief of Appellee at 37, 41,
Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989)(No. 526A88).
114. Turner, 325 N.C. at 170-71, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 167, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
117. Id. at 171, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
118. Id. Although not included in the opinion, evidence before the court which was not avail-
able at the Rule I l(a) hearing disputed representations made by Duke at that hearing. See New
Brief of Appellant at 18, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (No.526A88).
Duke represented that it learned just before trial that Dr. Havard would not be available for trial. Id.
Dr. Friedman's testimony at trial indicated that he was aware of efforts to schedule Dr. Havard's
deposition several months before trial.
119. Turner, 325 N.C. at 171, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
120. Id., 391 S.E.2d at 717-18.
121. Duke's counsel was five months pregnant, suffered from a ruptured disc and was confined
to bed for the last two weeks of June 1987. The court held this did not excuse her failure to provide
answers to outstanding discovery as ordered by July 1, 1987.
122. While a public reprimand was not ordered, it is interesting to note than an article in a
15
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4. Critique of the Court's Analysis
The standard of appellate review adopted in Turner is confusing and
subject to different interpretations. To date, the court has not interpreted
the Turner standard in another case. One case, Shook v. Shook, t23
quoted the test, recognized that it was controlling, and purported to ap-
ply it.' 24 However, the case provides little insight into the interpretation
of the new standard as it simply concludes each requirement was clearly
met.1 25  Nevertheless, it appears that the court failed to determine
whether the conclusion of law was supported by the findings of fact (the
second prong of the Turner test). 26 More importantly, the court pro-
vides no analysis as to how it reached its determination that the Turner
test was met.1 27 Therefore, the Shook opinion is of no assistance in in-
terpeting the Turner standard.
The new standard is different from any standard applied in the federal
or state courts. 28 Consequently, analysis of other jurisdictions provides
little assistance in interpreting the new North Carolina standard. There
is no discussion in Turner as to why this standard was created. Nor is
there any indication of which federal decisions influenced the drafting of
the new standard. The court has provided few clues about the standard's
origin, but the court's reasoning does provide some guidance as to the
meaning and intent of the new standard.
a. Background
i. De novo Hearing
A hearing de novo literally means a new hearing... It is in no sense a
review of the hearing previously held, but is a complete trial of the contro-
versy, the same as if no previous hearing had ever been held. It differs,
therefore, from an ordinary appeal... wherein the proceedings of the
hearing in the inferior court are reviewed and their validity determined
by the reviewing court. 12
9
In a de novo review, the court has the full power to determine the issues
weekly professional newspaper discussed the sanctions against the Raleigh attorney at length. Law-
yers Weekly, 2 NCLW 0941 (Nov. 6, 1989). Thus, the sanction was publicized although not by court
order. Turner v. Duke Univ., 85 CVS 1927 (Durham County Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1989) (Order for
Sanctions entered).
123. 95 N.C. App. 578, 383 S.E.2d 405 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 50, - S.E.2d -
(1990) (plaintiff's petition for discretionary review contained a conclusory statement that the Turner
standard was not properly applied. The petition did not provide the court with any explanation as to
why).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra, note 16.
129. Collier & Wallis, Ltd. v. Astor, 9 Cal. 2d 202, 205, 70 P.2d 171, 173 (1937) (emphasis
added).
16
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and rights of all parties involved as if the suit had been filed originally in
that court. 130 The court hears the merits with no presumption in favor of
the lower court's findings. 3 ' The court is not confined to the evidence
presented in the court below, but may hear any additional evidence of-
fered by the parties.'
32
ii. The Scope of Appellate Review in North Carolina
As a general rule, conclusions of law drawn by the trial judge from the
findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal. 33  Likewise, findings
that are based on a mixed question of fact and law are not binding on the
court; but, are also reviewable de novo. t31 Conversely, findings of fact are
binding on the appellate court where there is some evidence to support
the findings. 35  Nevertheless, an issue as to whether the findings of fact
are supported by sufficient evidence can be raised on appeal. 136
b. The New Standard of Appellate Review 137
i. The standard as written is inconsistent with a de novo review.
As discussed above, a de novo hearing is in no sense a review of the
130. In re Hayes, 261 N.C. 616, 622, 135 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1964); Appalachian Poster Advertis-
ing Co., Inc. v. Harrington, 89 N.C. App. 476, 478-79, 366 S.E.2d 705, 706-07 (1988).
131. Id.; Norris v. Grosvenor Marketing, Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 288 n.6 (2d Cir. 1986); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985)("We need not defer to the
lower court's opinion.").
132. Bagley v. Wood, 34 N.C. 90, 91 (1851).
133. Huyck Corp. v. Town of Wake Forest, 86 N.C. App. 13, 15, 356 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1987)
(citing Humphries v. City of Jacksonville, 300 N.C. 186, 187, 265 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1980); Food
Town Stores v. City of Salisbury, 300 N.C. 21, 26, 265 S.E.2d 123 127, aff'd, 321 N.C. 589, 364
S.E.2d 139 (1988)).
134. Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 548, 356 S.E.2d 586-87, reh'g.
denied, 320 N.C. 639, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987); Taylor v. Cone Mills, 306 N.C. 314, 293 S.E.2d 189
(1982).
135. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984); Henderson County v.
Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 120, 254 S.E.2d 160, 165 (1979) (findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if
there is evidence to support them); Davidson v. Duke Univ., 282 N.C. 676, 712, 194 S.E.2d 761, 783
(1973) ("findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by any... evidence."); N.C.R.
App. P. 16(a) (1989) ("Review by the Supreme Court..is to determine whether there is error of law in
the decision of the Court of Appeals" - not errors of fact).
136. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252 (citing, N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-l, R.
Civ. P. 52 (1953)).
137. The new standard is as follows:
The trial court's decision to impose or not to impose mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S. sec.
1A-l, Rule 11 (a) is reviewable de novo as a legal issue. In the de novo review, the appellate
court will determine (1) whether the trial court's conclusions of law support its judgment or
determination, (2) whether the trial court's conclusions of law are supported by its findings of
fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact are supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. If the
appellate court makes these three determinations in the affirmative, it must uphold the trial
court's decision to impose or to deny the imposition of mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S.
sec. 1A-l, Rule II (a).
Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714. (emphasis added).
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hearing previously held.' 38 It differs from an ordinary appeal wherein
the lower court ruling is reviewed to determine if it is valid.' 39 Neverthe-
less, the appellate standard adopted in Turner requires the appellate
court to review the lower court's judgment, conclusions of law, and find-
ings of fact."4 Furthermore, it states that it must uphold the lower
court's ruling if each is supported."4' This language restricts the court's
review to the three determinations set out. It does not allow the appel-
late court to draw its own findings of fact or conclusions of law. 142 Nor
does it take into consideration that new evidence may be presented to the
appellate court that was not available to the lower court. 14 3 Instead, the
standard requires that the appellate court only review the trial court's
decision to determine if it is in error. 144
The standard's requirements, as written, are inconsistent with a de
novo review. In addition, as discussed below, the standard is inconsistent
with the review that the Turner court conducted.
ii. The Turner court intended to adopt a full de novo review,
including a de novo factual review.
The Turner court considered evidence that was not available at the
July 20, 1987 Rule l(a) hearing."' Specifically, the court considered
trial testimony which directly disputed representations made by Duke's
counsel at the Rule 11 (a) hearing. ' 46 It then drew its own findings of fact
138. Collier & Wallis v. Astor, 9 Cal. 2d 202, 205, 70 P.2d 171, 173 (1937).
139. Id.
140. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714. Some courts require that the trial court's order
include findings of fact when an award of substantial compensatory sanctions is made. While recog-
nizing that this requirement heightens the responsibilities of the trial court, the Brown court stressed
its need for findings in order to evaluate the trial court's decision. Brown, 830 F.2d at 1440. It also
emphasized that the requirement may actually reduce the burden on the trial court as it remands
cases for findings when necessary. Id. (emphasis added). While Turner did not address whether it
was requiring the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in its orders, it is
apparent from the adopted appellate standard that findings will need to be included in the trial court's
order. All trial lawyers should be aware of this when preparing orders for the court.
141. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
.142. See Id.
143. See Id.; Bagley v. Wood, 34 N.C. 90, 91 (1851).
144. See Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
145. See supra text and accompanying notes 104-08.
146. The Rule 11 (a) hearing took place on July 20, 1987. The trial commenced on July 27, 1987.
Id. The opinion in Turner refers to trial testimony of Dr. Ozer which discredited representations
made by Duke at the Rule 1l(a) hearing. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714. Duke had
asserted at the Rule 11 (a) hearing that Dr. Ozer would not be testifying at trial as to the resectability
of Ms. Turner's cancer and, therefore, Dr. Scheerer's testimony was needed (thus, the reason for the
noticing of his deposition). Id. At trial, Dr. Ozer testified concerning the resectability of Ms. Tur-
ner's cancer. Id.
In addition, Duke had represented to the court at the Rule 11 (a) hearing that it did not learn of.
the unavailability of Dr. Havard until just before trial (thus the reason for noticing the deposition so
close to the trial date). However, defendant Friedman testified at trial that he was aware that the
scheduling of the deposition of Dr. Havard was being planned several months before trial. Id. This
18
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which were, in part, supported by evidence that was not before the trial
court. 147 The court's consideration of, and reliance on, this evidence (in
its determination as to whether the trial court's findings of fact were sup-
ported by a sufficiency of the evidence) amounts to a factual de novo
review. While this is consistent with a de novo review, it is inconsistent
with the language of the newly adopted standard. 148
The standard states that the decision whether to impose mandatory
sanctions under Rule 11 (a) is a legal issue that is reviewable de novo. t49
The standard then states that in the de novo review, the appellate court
will make several determinations, all of which involve questions of
law. 50 Regardless of the language in the standard, the Turner court con-
ducted a full de novo review and did not limit itself to a de novo review of
the legal issues.
c. Interpretation of the New Standard
Under a strict reading of the new standard, it appears that the use of
the term de novo in the standard has little or no meaning. However, the
Turner court conducted a de novo review. It considered new evidence
and drew its own findings and conclusions. It did not follow its articu-
lated new standard. If it had so confined itself, it would not have been
free to consider new evidence or to draw its own findings of fact. This-is
strong evidence that the Turner court did not intend the standard to be
as strict and confining as it appears. At some point in the analysis the
appellate court must be free to consider the evidence de novo and draw its
own findings of fact and conclusions of law if it so wishes. To reason
otherwise, negates the use of the term de novo. It is this writer's opinion
that the court intended to provide the framework for the appellate
court's review, but, to retain the freedom (through the application of a
full de novo review) to draw contrary findings and/or conclusions if the
evidence warrants.
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE TYPE OF SANCTION IMPOSED
A. The Turner Court's Analysis
The Turner court, relying on Westmoreland v. C.B.S., Inc. "', adopted
evidence is not mentioned in the Turner opinion. Id. However, it is difficult to imagine that this
evidence did not influence the court in its decision. Especially in light of the court's comment that
"the inference that the noticing and taking of the depositions of Dr. Havard and Dr. Scheerer repre-
sents an attempt to harass plaintiff in violation of Rule I I(a) is not difficult to make." Turner, 325
N.C. at 171, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
147. Id. at 169, 381 S.E.2d at 716-17.
148. See id. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
149. Id. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
150. Id.
151. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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an "abuse of discretion" standard for review of the type of sanctions im-
posed under Rule 11(a). 52 In Westmoreland, the court held that the
portion of Rule 11 that states: "shall impose sanctions" if a violation
occurs, concentrates the court's discretion on an appropriate sanction
rather than whether or not to impose sanctions.153 An abuse of discre-
tion standard is applied to review the type of sanctions imposed under
Rule 11 in all jurisdictions that have addressed the issue.' 54 As the Tur-
ner court did not expand any further on this issue, a brief look at the
federal case law is warranted.
B. The Federal Courts
If Rule 11 is violated, the imposition of sanctions is mandatory.'55
However, the trial court has broad discretion in determining what sanc-
tion is appropriate. 56 Rule 11 provides that "an appropriate sanction...
may include an order to pay. . . reasonable expenses... including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee."' 57 This does not preclude the imposition of other
sanctions.'1 8 Nor does it require that attorney's fees be awarded. 5 9
New Rule 11 was enacted because old Rule 11 was not effective in
deterring abuses of the legal system."6 The new Rule is intended to re-
duce the reluctance of the courts to impose sanctions.' 6 ' The new Rule
emphasizes the responsibility of the attorney and reinforces those obliga-
tions by the imposition of sanctions. 62 The purpose of sanctions under
Rule 11 is to deter the violating attorney as well as other attorneys from
violating the Rule.' 6 3 As such, the imposition of sanctions should be
educational, rehabilitative, and tailored to the particular wrong. 61 The
trial court should choose the sanction that fosters the purpose of Rule 11,
taking into account the nature of the case, the parties, and the viola-
tion. ' 6  The court should impose the least severe sanction which ade-
152. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d 714.
153. Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1174.
154. See supra note 16 and text accompanying notes 88-91.
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. 11(a) (Supp. 1989); Brown
v. Federation of State Medical Bds. of U.S., 830 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1987); Cabell v. Petty, 810
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1987). Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 876-78 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) ("There are no longer any free passes for attorneys who violate Rule 11.").
156. Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466; Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (emphasis added); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, R. Civ. P. 11(a)
(Supp. 1989) (emphasis added)).
158. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1986).
159. Doyle v. United States, 817 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1987).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en banc); See also Brown, 830
F.2d at 1439-40.
164. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 877.
165. Id.
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quately furthers the purpose of Rule 11.166 Nevertheless, drastic
remedies such as dismissal and default judgment are also available.' 6 7
The ultimate goal is to strike a balance between policing the exploitation
of the legal system and protecting the adversarial system.'
68
VI. CONCLUSION
The amendment of Rule 11(a) was a recognition by the North Caro-
lina General Assembly that litigation abuses need to be policed more
closely. The North Carolina courts have now joined the federal courts in
applying an objective reasonableness standard of review at the trial court
level. This standard gives the trial court the needed flexibility to consider
all factors which might have effected the pleader's conduct. In appar-
ently embracing a full de novo review at the appellate level, the court has
opened the door for a closer review of Rule 11 (a) rulings. The full de
novo review allows the court to scrutinize not only the trial court's rul-
ing, but the pleader's conduct as well. Most importantly, the new appel-
late standard now allows Rule 11 (a) to reach abuses that have, until now,
been unreachable. Specifically, representations that are later proven to
be false can now be refuted. Evidence discovered after a hearing can be
presented to the appellate court. In effect, evidence outside the record is
considered. This greatly expands the reach of Rule 11 (a).
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166. Id. at 877-78; Brown, 830 F.2d at 1437.
167. Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1557, n. 6.
168. Century Products, Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 251 (6th Cir. 1986).
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